Abstract: Social inclusion is a multidimensional phenomenon that involves social, psychological, political, and economic aspects of individuals' life. While social inclusion is a priority of the European Agenda 2020, little is known about individuals' preferences for social inclusion and their determinants. We investigate factors affecting preferences for social inclusion using a stated preference survey on juvenile rehabilitation. We show that ideological inclinations, concerns about crime, and altruistic motives play a significant role in explaining preferences for the social inclusion of juvenile offenders.
Introduction
We investigate preferences for social inclusion and their determinants in the context of minors involved in antisocial and criminal activities. Social inclusion is a multidimensional phenomenon that involves social, psychological, political, and economic aspects of individuals' life (Atkinson et al. 2002 , Bossert et al. 2007 , Chakravarty and D'Ambrosio 2006 , Poggi 2007 . It is a priority item of the European Agenda 2020 to ensure economic, social, and territorial cohesion by guaranteeing respect for the fundamental rights of people experiencing social exclusion, so that they can live in dignity and take an active part in society (European Council 2000 , World Bank 2013 . In the context of juvenile crime, this social objective recognizes the importance of juvenile rehabilitation programs. These programs aim at reincluding juvenile offenders in the society so that they can enjoy again the same opportunities of being a constructive component of society as their age peers.
An effective policy for reducing the influence of circumstances outside an individual control, such as education or community and peer effects, increases equality of opportunity (Fleurbaey 2008 , Roemer 1985 , 1998 . A rehabilitation policy for crime prevention that reduces the impact of such circumstances should improve the distribution of social opportunities across the young population (Berenji et al. 2014) . Thus, it is crucial for policymakers to adopt policy actions and incentives aimed at equalizing opportunities across the population so that individuals are fully responsible for their achievements as an outcome of their sole efforts. Knowledge about preferences for social inclusion informs about a society's propensity to eradicate disparities and other forms of marginalization that may arise, for example, as a consequence of anti-social behavior.
However, despite its importance, the investigation of what factors affect preferences for the social inclusion of juvenile offenders has remained largely unaddressed. In addition, the social willingness to invest in social inclusion and, in the context of the present research, in 3 rehabilitation programs of juvenile offenders may vary substantially among regions, across states and within the same state. With this objective in mind, we implement an ad hoc stated preference survey for juvenile rehabilitation. We focus on a northern and a southern region of Italy, Veneto and Sicily, because characterized by markedly different cultural norms and social capital endowments (Bigoni et al. 2015 , Guiso et al. 2004 , Putnam 1993 .
The comparison between these two regions can be very instructive in explaining preferences for social inclusion and their underlying motives. Veneto is a wealthy region representing the northern Italian culture, while Sicily the southern culture. In recent decades, Sicily has experienced a significantly lower rate of growth in incomes and job opportunities, 1 and has a long history of criminal organizations, notoriously working with the collusion of state institutions. The lack of opportunities available to young Sicilians is a factor that can increase the risk of social exclusion forcing young people to join the "informal" criminal labour market.
We develop a theoretical model in which individual preferences for social inclusion are motivated by altruistic motives. Altruism is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for social inclusion because, for example, a self-interested individual may be socially inclusive simply because an investment in a rehabilitation program may reduce the chances to be exposed to the risk of being a victim. In our set-up, adults are concerned with the utility of their own children, defined as parental altruism, and the utility of children of other families, defined as non-parental altruism. In general, a family in poverty may be socially inclusive, in the sense of being willing to support poverty mitigation programs, because directly interested.
A wealthier family may be socially inclusive to avoid the self-interested risk of falling into poverty or may be in favour of inclusive policies for altruistic reasons. Similarly, a family 4 with a child who has had some troubles with the law may be directly interested in rehabilitation policies. On the other hand, families without children could support rehabilitation initiatives as well, but indirectly. In these cases, non-parental altruistic motives may play a relatively more important role.
We compare households with and without children to reveal the relative importance of parental and non-parental forms of altruism in the two Italian regions. We enrich our empirical analysis by distinguishing between factors affecting preferences for the social inclusion of juvenile offenders in terms of individual characteristics, such as education, income, ideological inclinations, and contextual variables, such as immigration and crime rates.
We find no differences in terms of social inclusion between North and South of Italy.
However, we find that the factors explaining preferences for social inclusion are significantly different between the two regions. In Veneto, the propensity for social inclusion is driven by the concern about crime, while in Sicily it is mainly affected by socio-economic characteristics, such as income and education. In addition, we find that in both regions altruistic motives and the ideological inclinations of respondents appear to play a significant role in determining preferences for the social inclusion of juvenile offenders.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework. Section 3 describes the survey design and the data. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy, and Section 5 the results. Section 6 provides some final remarks.
Theoretical Framework
We describe preferences for the social inclusion of juvenile offenders first using a theoretical model in which household choices are conditioned by the wellbeing of children, and then, measuring the willingness to pay for juvenile rehabilitation programs. 
A Model of Social Inclusion with Altruism
Socially inclusive behaviour towards juvenile offenders can be explained by underlying motives such as altruism towards household members and friends, and even towards strangers. We assume that adults display some degree of altruism towards children. Altruism is defined in a narrow "parental" sense, when the adult act of giving is to children of the same family, and in a large "non-parental" sense, when it is to children of other families.
2 Our view shares Khalil's (2004) contention that altruism is a form of charity motivated by the concern over the welfare of others. As it is realistic that "charity begins at home", because individuals' primary responsibility should be for the needs of their own family and friends, altruism
should not be confused with parental care and parent-child transfers of money (Khalil 2004 ).
In our context, the term parental altruism does not refer to direct transfers of adults to their own children, but to transfers towards an institution.
Households comprise adults a with or without children c. Adults of household i care, to different extents, about the utility of their children , when present, and of household j's children . Formally, when children are present, preferences of adults are described by the following utility function with and
where is a vector of goods consumed by the adult, measures parental altruism (PA), and non-parental altruism (NPA). 3 Parents are also committed to maximizing the investment in the quality of their children that, as a result, may reduce the chances that children will have trouble with the law. Parents who are highly committed to invest in the 6 quality of their children may be less willing to support rehabilitation programs for their child.
The utility of parents also depends on a vector of household characteristics z i and the expected harm from an offense that may occur with subjective probability . The subjective probability of being the victim of a crime depends on the effectiveness of the rehabilitation program. Interestingly, the objective probability of being a victim is usually small, as can be seen from crime statistics presented in Appendix A, but the perceived risk may be very high.
In our case study, the adults' utility function also depends on the participation in a referendum to finance rehabilitation programs for juvenile offenders. When participating in the referendum, adults can express a positive or a negative vote. Though adults will never use the rehabilitation service for themselves, they may still be willing to vote "yes" mainly to offer juvenile offenders the option of being reintegrated into the society (McConnell 1997) . Thus, in our context the participation in the referendum reveals adults' preferences for the social inclusion of juvenile offenders.
Adults' optimal decision about the participation in the referendum is
where is a vector of market prices of goods consumed by the household, is the exogenous household income, and are the indirect utility functions evaluated at the equilibrium point when adults vote "yes" or "no" to the referendum, respectively. Among other exogenous variables, such as market prices, income and household socio-economic characteristics, the optimal participation choice of adults depends on their parental and non-parental altruism .
For households without children, the adult utility function falls to
Compared with equation (1) the parental altruism term is by force excluded and the adult utility is not affected by child quality because there are no children. In this case, the optimal participation choice in the referendum is not a function of parental altruism .
We are also interested in aggregating individual preferences for social inclusion into collective preferences for the society as a whole. We do so resorting to two revealed (stated) preference arguments. Participants in the referendum are then asked to reveal their willingness to pay for the introduction of rehabilitation programs of juvenile offenders.
Willingness To Pay for Juvenile Rehabilitation Programs
Traditionally, individual willingness to pay reveals preferences for a good consumed directly by the person interviewed. In our study, willingness to pay measures the economic trade-off for a public service that is neither going to be directly nor indirectly used by the respondents but eventually by their children or children of the same society the respondents belong to. A method for eliciting willingness to pay is the contingent valuation (Alberini et al. 2007 
and for households without children WTP is given by
Because there are no appropriate proxy markets for juvenile rehabilitation programs from which to infer individual preferences, we elicit individuals' preferences using a singlebounded dichotomous choice model for contingent valuation (Alberini et al. 2007) . People are asked whether they would vote in favour or against the proposed public program in a 9 referendum if implementation costs € X to the household in the form of extra income taxes.
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The dichotomous choice approach has been shown to be incentive-compatible: provided that respondents understand that the provision of the good depends on the majority of votes, and the respondent's own vote in itself cannot influence the provision, truth-telling is in the respondent's best interest (Harrison 2007, Hoehn and Randall 1987) . In addition, to mimicking the behaviour of people in regular marketplaces or voting situations, the dichotomous choice approach is also credited with reducing the cognitive burden placed on the respondent.
As illustrated in equation (1), parents are willing to offer monetary support for rehabilitation programs because are concerned both about their children and, to a lesser extent, about the children of other households. Instead, adults without children are willing to pay mainly for a non-parental altruistic motive. In an empirical setting, it is then possible to observe that on average the willingness to pay of a household with children (WTP ) may differ significantly from the willingness to pay of a childless household (WTP ). Given the adult preference structures in equations (1) and (3), we can construct the following ordering that isolates the relative importance of the altruistic motives. To interpret these cases, let us refer to equation (1) We test these hypotheses by estimating the reduced form equations of participation decision and WTP as described in Section 4. The reduced equation for participation is specified as a function of factors that may affect adults' preferences for the social inclusion of juvenile offenders. We control among other variables for socio-economic characteristics, such as education, marital status and household income, which can be correlated with the production of child quality. We also have information on the respondent's concern about the risk of crime as a subjective fear of injury in a criminal event, and on crime rates at the provincial level as a proxy for the objective probability to be harmed by an offensive behaviour.
Survey Design and Data Description

Survey Design
Our data source is an original survey designed by the authors. 5 This survey was conducted in two Italian regions, Veneto and Sicily, in Fall 2009 using computer assisted telephone interviews (CATI). 6 The sample comprises 1,027 observations, 513 observations from the Veneto region and 514 observations from the Sicily region. 7 The data are a representative sample of households from the population of households with land-based or cellular telephone service. The survey was prepared following the guidelines by the NOAA Blue
Ribbon Panel (Arrow et al. 1993) . In each region we carried out a pre-test of about 5% of the planned sample size. We interviewed individuals between 18 and 65 years old.
The survey collected information on plausible factors that may affect respondents' preferences for juvenile offender rehabilitation programs, and hence social inclusion. A first set of questions gathers information on respondents' socio-economic characteristics, such as age, gender, education, working status, household disposable income, political and religious orientations. Another set of questions collects information on respondents' subjective perception of safety and crime. Specifically, this set contains questions about the perceived level of safety in the neighbourhood where the respondent lives, what crimes concern the respondent most, such as property crime, violent crime, murder or juvenile crime, whether the respondent adopts crime safety measures at home, and whether the respondent or a family 12 member had experienced a crime in the past. The last section of the survey includes questions assessing respondents' willingness to pay for juvenile rehabilitation programs. This section is properly designed to frame the contingent market scenario of interest. In particular, it contains the following four subjects: Then, respondents declaring that they would vote "yes" are asked a close-ended contingent valuation question, i.e. whether they and/or the members of their family would be willing to pay a bid amount €X as annual local income tax for the rehabilitation program. This two-part model for eliciting preferences identifies respondents with zero willingness to pay. The amounts chosen for the bid are (€ 50, € 70, € 100, € 180, € 250, € 350, € 500). The amounts are determined on the basis of two pre-tests for each region using the bid design approach by Cooper (1993) , and are randomly assigned to respondents.
(iv) A debriefing question that asks why they were not willing to pay for the rehabilitation program. In addition, we account for community factors that might affect respondents' preferences for social inclusion such as the ratio of violent, property, and other crimes as well as for the immigration rate at the provincial level, which has been found to affect crime perception (Nunziata 2015, Montolio and Planells-Strus 2015) . 10 For instance, we might 
Data Description
Estimation Strategy
We now describe the econometric strategies adopted for studying the factors affecting preferences for the social inclusion of juvenile offenders and the willingness to pay for juvenile rehabilitation programs.
Preferences for the Social Inclusion of Juvenile Offenders
We estimate a probit model in which participation P in a referendum to finance juvenile rehabilitation programs is the dependent variable. We define an indicator variable P irp = 1 if individual i from region r (r = Veneto, Sicily) living in province p votes "yes" to a referendum that would increase local income taxes to finance juvenile offender rehabilitation programs, and P irp = 0 otherwise. The choice problem is described by the latent variable model
where is the net benefit an individual receives from the implementation of the rehabilitation program. Individuals will vote "yes" to the referendum if the expected net benefits of doing so are positive. The probability that the individual votes "yes" to the referendum is prob prob
where is the standard normal cdf. The model specification of equation (8) follows the theoretical framework presented in Section 2.1. The vector refers to a set of household socio-economic characteristics modelling the vector z i of the adult utility function. The set of socio-economic variables comprises age, gender, marital status, education, family structure, presence of children aged 0-17, household income, political, and religious orientations. It also includes variables describing the respondents' concern about crime risk, which can be considered as proxies of the subjective probability of being harmed by criminal behaviour. These variables are the perceived level of safety in the neighbourhood where the respondent lives, whether she is worried about crime and what type of crimes concern the respondent most, whether the respondent has adopted security measures at home, and any experience as a victim.
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The vector refers to a set of variables aggregated at the provincial level that may affect the respondent's propensity for social inclusion. The vector includes the immigration rate and the proportions of property and violent crimes out of the total number of crimes.
These variables serve as a proxy measure of the objective probability of being a victim of a crime. We also add an independent and identically normally distributed error term  irp for the two regions clustered at the provincial level.
We test for differences in the determinants of preferences for social inclusion between
Sicily and Veneto by pooling the two sub-samples and estimating an amendment of equation (7) where subscript V stands for Veneto and subscript S stands for Sicily; and the expressions in square brackets measure the difference in the coefficients of the vectors of covariates when the respondent is from Veneto as compared to Sicily.
Willingness To Pay for Juvenile Rehabilitation Programs
The amount that individuals are willing to pay for juvenile rehabilitation programs is estimated by applying the spike model (Kriström 1997) . The spike approach is particularly useful when a large proportion of the sample decides not to buy the good offered in the contingent market. In such cases, standard parametric models based on the normal, logistic or
Weibull distribution are likely to predict a biased willingness to pay because they assume that all individuals have a positive WTP (Kriström 1997 ).
The spike model consists of two stages. In the first stage, we model the probability that the respondent would be willing to participate in the program by voting "yes" to a referendum as described in the previous section. In the second stage, we estimate how much respondents are willingness to pay. In the second stage, the researcher does not observe WTP 
where WTP means that the individual's response to the stated amount B irp is a "yes"
and WTP means that the response is a "no." Considering the two stages, the possible combinations of answers are (yes, yes), (yes, no), (no, no). Because we observe discrete outcomes, we model the probabilities of "yes" and "no" responses with the following loglikelihood function ln ln WTP ln ln
where K is the sample size; P irp is equal to one if individual i from region r living in province p votes "yes" to the referendum to finance juvenile offender rehabilitation programs, zero otherwise, as described in the previous section. is the probability that individual i's WTP is not greater than the bid value .
We follow this two-stage framework because it allows us to account for nonparticipation in the contingent valuation market of juvenile rehabilitation programs and, therefore, to avoid potentially large biases in the estimation of the willingness to pay.
Empirical Results
Preferences for the Social Inclusion of Juvenile Offenders
In both regions, we find that about 40% of the respondents would vote "yes" to a hypothetical referendum promoting the increase of local income taxes to finance rehabilitation programs for juvenile offenders (Table 1 ). The remaining 60% of respondents would vote "no" to the 
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The two regions may differ substantially, though, in terms of the factors affecting the propensity for social inclusion. Table 2 shows the marginal effects of a set of probit models on the determinants of social inclusion for an average respondent living in Veneto and in Sicily. 12 The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the respondent votes "yes" to the referendum for financing juvenile rehabilitation programs and to zero otherwise. We specify two models per region, differing in the set of variables used as controls. Models (1) and (2) refer to the Veneto sample, and models (3) and (4) refer to the Sicily sample. In models (1) and (3) we control for socio-economic characteristics and ideological inclinations of the respondent. In models (2) and (4) we add variables related to the respondent's concern about crime risk, which proxy the subjective probability of being victim of a crime, and variables that control for crime and immigration rates aggregated at the provincial level as indicators of the objective probability of being damaged from an offense. Results are robust to different model specifications. We first present the results for Veneto, and then for Sicily.
Veneto. Socio-economic characteristics are in general not significant factors affecting preferences for the social inclusion of juvenile offenders, with the exception of gender and family structure. The estimation of model (2) shows that female respondents are significantly less likely to vote "yes" in a referendum to finance juvenile rehabilitation programs. Family size is significantly and negatively associated with the probability to support juvenile rehabilitation programs. In addition, respondents with children are 21 percentage points more likely to vote "yes" than those without children. A remarkable result, holding for all model specifications, is that in Veneto preferences for social inclusion are not significantly associated with household income. This evidence shows that respondents would finance juvenile rehabilitation programs regardless of their level of income. In addition, the 12 Coefficient estimates are available from the authors upon request. 20 ideological inclinations are jointly significant at 1% level. In particular, the political orientation seems to be a significant factor affecting preferences for social inclusion: leftwing orientated respondents are more likely to vote "yes" than right-wing oriented respondents.
Variables capturing the subjective perception of crime are generally significant.
Respondents who live in quite a safe area are significantly more likely to vote "yes" to the referendum than those living in an unsafe area. In addition, the respondent's concern about crime significantly increases the probability of voting "yes" to the referendum for juvenile rehabilitation programs. For instance, the propensity for social inclusion is 31 percentage points higher if respondents are more concerned about rape than any other crime. However, having been the victim of a crime and/or having relatives that experienced a criminal assault in the past does not significantly affect the propensity for social inclusion.
The variables related to the immigration rate and crime rates while not individually significant are jointly highly significant factors affecting the propensity for social inclusion (p-value = 0.000). Table 2 highlights remarkable regional dissimilarities in the qualitative importance of the factors driving the propensity for the social inclusion of juvenile offenders. Unlike the results for Veneto respondents, the socioeconomic characteristics of Sicilian respondents are in general significant determinants.
Sicily. Comparison of model (4) with model (2) of
Married respondents, respondents living in large families, and respondents living in families with elderly people are all more likely to vote "yes" to the proposed referendum. However, the presence of children is not a significant factor. The effect of family income on the demand for juvenile rehabilitation programs is large and significant for all income quintiles.
Even after controlling for income, respondents who have a high school diploma are 19% more likely to vote "no" to the referendum compared to respondents with a university degree.
Furthermore, as in Veneto, the ideological inclinations are significant determinants.
Respondents not interested in political matters have a significant lower probability of voting "yes" compared to right-wing respondents. The probability of voting in favour of the referendum is nine percentage points higher if respondents are practicing members of a Church than if they are not. Unlike the results for Veneto, variables capturing the respondent's concern about crime risk are generally not significant drivers of preferences for social inclusion, except for homicides' concern. In addition, the macro variables jointly and significantly affect the probability of voting "yes" to the referendum (p-value = 0.000). An increase in the violent crime rate and in the rate of foreign residents significantly increases the probability of voting "yes". In particular, the rate of foreign residents has a strong and positive effect. A 10% increase in the immigration rate would increase the probability of voting "yes" in the referendum by 6 percentage points.
Comparing Veneto and Sicily. To test whether there are significant differences in the determinants of preferences for social inclusion, we pool the two samples of Veneto and
Sicily and estimate equation (9) including interaction terms between the dichotomous variable Veneto and each independent variable of the model. The last column of Table 2 shows the significance level of the difference between determinants for Veneto respondents as compared to Sicily respondents. The significance levels are obtained by applying Ai and Norton (2003) and Greene (2010) procedure for treating interaction terms within nonlinear models.
The estimated results confirm the presence of strong differences in the determinants of preferences for social inclusion between the two regions. Socio-economic factors in general affect the propensity for social inclusion of Sicilians but not of respondents from Veneto.
Whereas, having children positively affects the propensity for social inclusion in Veneto but not in Sicily. The effects of ideological inclinations as well as of the concern about crime risk 22 are not statistically different between the two regions. On the other hand, both samples are strongly affected by the objective probability of being harmed by a crime. However, when the macro variables are taken individually, only Sicilian respondents are affected by violent crime rates and immigration rates. Respondents living in areas with higher crime rates have a higher propensity to socially include juvenile offenders. In addition, a higher immigration rate significantly increases the propensity for social inclusion in Sicily but not in Veneto.
Willingness to pay for Juvenile Rehabilitation Programs
We test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 described in Section 2.2 to investigate the relative importance of altruism as a determinant of preferences for social inclusion. Table 3 shows mean willingness to pay estimates for Veneto and Sicily. Intra-society comparisons (Hypothesis 1) show that in Veneto households with children ( = € 82) have a significantly higher mean WTP than childless households ( = € 47). In contrast, in
Sicily mean WTP of households with children (€ 84) is not statistically different than mean WTP of households without children (€ 73). Based on Hypothesis 1, these results imply that in Veneto altruism plays a more important role in explaining preferences for social inclusion in households with children than in households without children (Case 1). In Sicily, nonparental altruism appears to be a significant underlying motive affecting preferences for the social inclusion of juvenile offenders in households without children, and it is larger than both parental and non-parental altruism in households with children (Case 2).
Inter-society comparisons (Hypothesis 2) reveal that Sicilians are significantly willing to pay more than Veneto respondents for juvenile rehabilitation programs, € 76 versus € 59, respectively. Furthermore, the mean WTP of households with children is not statistically different between the two regions (€ 82 in Veneto and € 84 in Sicily), while households without children in Veneto have a significantly lower mean WTP than Sicilian households without children (€ 47 and € 73 respectively). Based on Hypothesis 2 and because the two regions have comparable preferences for social inclusion, these results imply that Sicilian households are more altruistic towards juvenile offenders than Veneto households.
Discussion and Conclusions
In a period of economic crisis and scarce public resources that may put the sustainability of juvenile justice systems at risk, it is important for policy makers to know the value of investments for social inclusion, such as rehabilitation programs for juvenile offenders, and the factors affecting their demand. This information would allow policy makers to allocate public resources across generations efficiently. However, little is known about the factors affecting individuals' preferences for the social inclusion of juvenile offenders.
Our study explores individual preferences for the social inclusion of juvenile offenders by using data from a stated preference survey on juvenile rehabilitation in Italy. We develop a theoretical model that allows us to explore underlying factors such as parental and nonparental altruism that could explain differences in preferences for social inclusion and juvenile rehabilitation programs. Our research design takes advantage of the contrasting socio-cultural and economic backgrounds of two regions in the North and South of Italy (Veneto and Sicily), under the same criminal justice system, to gauge whether there are differences in the factors affecting preferences for social inclusion.
We find that both regions are equally socially inclusive, though there are significant differences in the factors affecting preferences for the social inclusion of juvenile offenders between the two regions. We show that differences in preferences for the social inclusion of juvenile offenders do not depend only on socio-demographic characteristics but also on ideological inclinations, such as religious and political orientations, as well as on altruistic motives. In Veneto left-wing oriented individuals are more socially inclusive, while in Sicily respondents not interested in political matters and those that regularly attend Church services have higher propensity to invest in social reintegration programs of juvenile offenders.
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In addition, in Sicily socio-economic characteristics are significant determinants of social inclusion, while in Veneto the individual concern about crime is an important factor positively affecting the propensity for social inclusion. The income distribution of the Veneto population, as opposed to Sicily, is not a significant factor for social inclusion. We also find that the objective probability of being the victim of a crime, as measured by the immigration rate and the number of reported crimes, exerts a significant role in affecting the propensity for the social inclusion of juvenile offenders. Respondents living in areas with higher crime rates have a higher propensity to socially include juvenile offenders. However, a higher immigration rate significantly increases the propensity for social inclusion in Sicily but not in
Veneto.
Moreover, our study shows that the mean WTP of respondents living in Sicily is higher than the mean WTP of respondents living in Veneto. On average, Sicilian households are willing to pay about 30% more than Veneto respondents (€ 76 versus € 59) for juvenile rehabilitation programs. Based on our theoretical model, the difference in willingness to pay may be related to a higher altruistic component of Sicilians' preferences for social inclusion than Veneto households.
Another relevant contribution to the existing literature is the estimation of the internal rate of social returns stemming from the investment in rehabilitation programs for juvenile offenders by relating benefits and costs in the two regions of interest. Public awareness of the size of these social returns should help policymakers take informed decisions about juvenile justice policies. Based on the household's WTP estimates presented in Table 3 and the total number of households in Veneto and Sicily in 2009, the annual benefits that society derives from juvenile rehabilitation programs are about 116 million Euros in Veneto and 148 million Euros in Sicily. Comparing these estimated benefits with the total costs of the juvenile justice system, which is mainly based on rehabilitation programs, of 16 million Euros in Veneto and 25 of 107 million Euros in Sicily (Ciappi et al. 2015) , where the size of the juvenile offender population is about four times as in Veneto, we obtain a benefit/cost ratio of 7.25 in Veneto and 1.4 in Sicily. These figures show that investments in rehabilitation programs are highly attractive. This difference shows that interregional differences, presumably also across European States, can be substantial. This evidence, if gathered for all European member states, should in principle guide the socially efficient allocation of resources fostering social inclusion programs in the member states.
In addition, public resources fostering a more inclusive society are often not allocated from public funds collected through the fiscal system, especially during a recession. The revealed willingness to pay may be captured, at least in part, through the solidarity channel by fostering innovative social institutions, such as community foundations, designed to pool donations into coordinated and effective social inclusion programs. The "Difference" column shows the significance level of the difference between determinants for Veneto respondents compared to Sicily respondents obtained by pooling the two samples and by applying Ai and Norton (2003) and Greene (2010) . *** , ** , * = significant at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively; n.s. = not significant. Figure A1 shows the number of crimes per 100,000 inhabitants by type of criminal offense reported to the police. The statistics refer to crimes involving either adults or juvenile offenders. Both are presented because in Italy about 80% of adult offenders were formerly young offenders and because adult crime affects the risk perception that young people may be either affected by, or involved in, anti-social activities.
Panel 1.A, Figure A1 shows that the adult violent crime rate increased both at the Figure A1 shows that the rate of adult property crimes increased in both regions, by 5% in Veneto and 3.6% in Sicily from 1999 to 2007. In sharp contrast, during these years, the property crime rate was constantly higher in Veneto than Sicily. In the same period, Veneto reported a higher total crimes rate than in Sicily ( Figure reported to the police involving children 10-17 years old per 100,000 in the 10-17 age group. Source: ISTAT (http://giustiziaincifre.istat.it).
